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COMMERCE

CLAUSE

Are California's Milk Pricing Regulations Exempt
from Scrutiny Under Both the Commerce
and Privilege and Immunities Clauses?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 431-435. 0 2003 American Bar Association.

Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee, Wis.;
(414) 288-7094 or
Rcanzivino@aol.com

ISSUE
Does 7 U.S.C. § 7254 exempt provisions of California's milk pricing regulations from scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause and the Privilege
and Immunities Clause?

FACTS
The sale of milk in nearly all of the
48 contiguous states is regulated by
the Federal Milk Marketing Program.
One major exception is California,
which is the leading milk producer
in the United States. In 1996,
Congress passed the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act (hereinafter the "1996
Farm Bill"). Section 144 of the 1996
Farm Bill, now 7 U.S.C. § 7254,
specifically addresses the authority
of the state of California over milk
standards, and it provides:

ue to effect any law, regulation,
or requirement regarding-(1)
the percentage of milk solids or
solids not fat in fluid milk products sold at retail or marketed in
the State of California; or (2) the
labeling of such fluid milk products with regard to milk solids or
solids not fat.
In 1997, the California Department
of Food and Agriculture (CDFA)
amended its pricing regulations
arguably to the disadvantage of outof-state dairy farmers and in favor of
in-state dairy farmers. Petitioners
are corporations and individuals
who operate dairy farms in Nevada
and Arizona. In two separate actions
(that are now consolidated), they
challenge the constitutionality of
the 1997 amendments to
California's milk regulations.
Petitioners contend that the 1997
amendments directly burden and
discriminate against out-of-state
dairy farmers in violation of the
(Continued on Page 432)

HILLSIDE DAIRY ET AL. V LYONS
AND
PONDEROSA DAIRY ET AL. V LYONS

Section 7254. Effect on Fluid milk
standards in State of California
Nothing in this Act or any other
provision of law shall be construed to preempt, prohibit, or
otherwise limit the authority of
the State of California, directly or
indirectly, to establish or contin-
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Commerce Clause and the Privilege
and Immunities Clause. Without
reaching the constitutional merits,
the district court rejected petitioners' claims. In granting summary
judgment for the state on the
Commerce Clause claims, the district court relied on Shamrock
Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F.3d
1177 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1105 (1999). The district
court interpreted Shamrock Farms
as holding that 7 U.S.C. § 7254
immunized California's milk pricing
regulations from Commerce Clause
challenge. The district court dismissed the claim under the Privilege
and Immunities Clause on the
ground that the pricing regulations
did not discriminate on the basis of
residency.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in
PonderosaDairy v. Lyons, 259 F.3d
1148 (9th Cir. 2001). The circuit
court agreed with the district court
that Shamrock Farms controlled
the Commerce Clause claim. The
Ninth Circuit broadly interpreted its
decision in Shamrock Farms so
that both pricing and compositional
regulations fell within the purview
of § 7254. The result was that the
pricing regulations were insulated
from Commerce Clause scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner's claims
under the Privilege and Immunities
Clause. The court reasoned that the
1997 amendments did not, on their
face, create classifications based on
any individual's residency or citizenship. Rather, the court observed
that the regulations created classifications that were based on where
the milk was produced. Petitioner's
writ of certiorari was granted on
January 10, 2003. Hillside Dairy
Inc. v. Lyons, 123 S.Ct. 818 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
This case involves the interpretation
of 7 U.S.C. § 7254. Petitioners

acknowledge that this federal
statute does protect some body of
California law against some body of
federal law. Further, petitioners
admit that Congress may confer
upon a state the ability to restrict
the flow of interstate commerce that
a state would not otherwise enjoy.
But, for a state regulation to be
removed from the reach of the
Commerce Clause, the congressional intent must be unmistakably
clear. Petitioners argue that this
case falls far short of that standard.
Petitioners maintain that § 7254
does not protect the 1997 pricing
amendments. The 1997 amendments are economic regulations of
raw milk. "Raw milk" is milk that
comes directly from the dairy
farmer. Section 7254 specifically
refers to "fluid milk products"
(processed milk), not raw milk.
Therefore, § 7254 has no application to raw milk, only processed
milk. Necessarily, section 7254 cannot be used to protect the 1997
amendments from Commerce
Clause scrutiny. Further, the statutory text does not unambiguously
indicate that Congress intended to
exempt any of California's laws from
the Commerce Clause. Section 7254
does not refer to the Commerce
Clause specifically or to the
Constitution more generally.
Moreover, its directive that no provision of law "shall be construed" in a
particular manner is more naturally
read as referring only to nonconstitutional sources of law. In passing
legislation, Congress is not ordinarily assumed to have intended to constrain the judiciary's authority to
construe the Constitution. Thus, §
7254 is best understood as protecting California's laws against preemption only by "this Act" (the Farm
Bill) and any other provisions of
federal statutory or regulatory law,
but not the Constitution.

Petitioners further assert that the
legislative history of § 7254 cannot
be used to preclude Commerce
Clause scrutiny. First, petitioners
assert that a statute's legislative history can never supply "unmistakably clear" evidence of congressional intent when such evidence is
lacking from the text of the statute.
This principle finds support in both
the Supreme Court's decisions and
logic. The Supreme Court has stated
that evidence of congressional
intent must be both "unequivocal
and textual." Upon the passage of a
law, the only thing before all of the
members of Congress and the president who signs it is the text of the
statute, not its voluminous legislative history. If something is unclear
on the face of the statute, any clearer statement in the legislative history will, at a minimum, raise doubts
about why that statement appears
in the legislative history rather than
the statutory text. The inference is
that it appears only in the legislative
history precisely because it could
not receive the assent of a majority
of each House and the signature of
the president. Therefore, the very
failure to put the clear statement
into the text of the statute precludes
the conclusion that Congressas opposed to some subset of its
members-has made its intent
unmistakably clear.
Second, the statute's legislative history does not support the proposition that § 7254 was intended to
preclude Commerce Clause scrutiny. There is no conference expert to
support the preclusion. There is no
committee report to support the
preclusion. Finally, there is no mention in any of the legislative history
to § 7254 of the Commerce Clause
or the Constitution. Clearly, the legislative history to § 7254 does not
support the proposition that § 7254
protects California's milk pricing
regulations from Commerce Clause
scrutiny.

Issue No. 7

Finally, petitioners believe that the
Privilege and Immunities Clause was
not properly considered in the lower
courts. The lower courts failed to
consider the "practical effect" of the
economic regulations on the petitioners. The Supreme Court's application of the Privilege and
Immunities Clause has consistently
involved an examination of the
"practical effect" of state laws and
regulations on out-of-state residents.
It is the "practical effect" of the
state law, whether it produces discrimination against nonresidents,
that determines whether a state's
law violates the Privilege and
Immunities Clause. Petitioner's data
indicates that the vast majority of
persons engaged in the production
of raw milk reside on the farms that
produce the milk. By discriminating
on the basis of the location of the
farm where the milk is produced,
the California pricing regulations
have the "practical effect" of discriminating against producers who
do not reside in California. This violates the fundamental guarantee of
the Privilege and Immunities
Clause-not to be discriminated
against based on one's residency.
Initially, respondent maintains that
petitioners are urging the Supreme
Court to adopt an inappropriate
standard when interpreting § 7254.
Petitioners assert that the Supreme
Court must use the standard requiring "both unequivocal and textual"
evidence of congressional intent to
find a Commerce Clause exemption.
Respondent asserts that this more
stringent standard derives from a
line of Supreme Court decisions
that involve state sovereignty, and
that such a standard has never been
applied to Commerce Clause cases.
Rather, the correct standard is simply that congressional intent is
established by evidence that is
"unmistakably clear."

Despite this disagreement over the
appropriate standard, respondent
argues that the text of § 7254 shows
an "unmistakably clear" intent to
exempt California's milk laws from
the Commerce Clause. The text of §
7254 expressly refers to preemption. It also states that no law shall
be construed to prohibit or otherwise limit the authority of the state
of California. The language of §
7254 is similar in breadth and
specificity to the language of other
statutes and regulations that have
previously been relied upon by the
Supreme Court to find a Commerce
Clause exemption. Significantly,
none of those other statutes or regulations explicitly references either
the Commerce Clause or the
Constitution. Rather, the language
at issue in each of those cases variously authorized the state to engage
in regulatory conduct affecting
interstate commerce. Similarly, the
language of § 7254 allows California
to enact laws regarding the content
and labeling of fluid milk.
Further, the legislative history of §
7254 demonstrates that Congress
did intend to permit California to
enforce laws regarding milk content
even if those laws affected interstate
commerce. When § 7254 was adopted, the federal Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA)
prohibited a state from having any
composition or labeling standard for
any food, including fluid milk, in
interstate commerce that was not
identical to any existing federal
standard for the same product. This
prohibition did not apply to
intrastate products, only interstate
ones. Thus, NLEA preempted
California's more stringent standards for fluid milk that was in
interstate commerce. Section 7254
was enacted in response to the
NLEA. Having initially exercised its
Commerce Clause power to limit
the authority of California to affect
interstate commerce (the NLEA),

Congress then acted to allow
California, directly or indirectly, to
regulate fluid milk content and
labeling in interstate commerce 0
7254). Clearly, Congress's intent
was to permit California to promulgate its own milk laws without
Commerce Clause challenge.
Respondent further argues that §
7254 is broadly worded to exempt
all of California's milk laws from
Commerce Clause challenge. The
language in § 7254 is very broad. It
expressly protects California's
authority, "directly or indirectly, to
establish or continue to effect any
law, regulation, or requirement
regarding" fluid milk product content and labeling. Section 7254 covers not only laws that existed when
that section was adopted, but new
laws as well, whether established
directly or indirectly. Indeed, the
phrase "directly or indirectly" in §
7254 is so general that it alone
could be interpreted to cover all
of California's milk regulatory
programs.
The only possible limitation to the
scope of § 7254 is that the laws and
regulations must relate to fluid milk
composition or labeling. In considering this limitation, the Court
should accord significant weight to
California's own determination of
what laws support its unique fluidmilk content standards. The history
of California's milk standards, basic
economic principles, and California
judicial and legislative pronouncements all show a close connection
between milk pricing laws and fluid
milk content. Therefore, the milk
pricing regulations are clearly within the scope of § 7254.
Respondent asserts that because
California's milk pricing laws do not
discriminate based on residency,
petitioners cannot state a claim
under the Privilege and Immunities
(Continued on Page 434)
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Clause. It is well-established that
the Privilege and Immunities Clause
is violated only if a state law
discriminates against nonresidents
by depriving them of a protected
privilege that is accorded to residents. The founders understood
that, to form one nation, states
could not discriminate against citizens of other states. A strong union
could be formed only if nonresidents entering a state were accorded all the rights of the state's citizens. To carry out this purpose, the
Privilege and Immunities Clause
requires that a state place the citizens of each state upon the same
footing with citizens of other states.
Thus, the clause guarantees that,
when nonresidents enter a state,
they will be permitted to do business on the same basis as the citizens of that state.
The Privilege and Immunities Clause
is not applicable to laws that regulate
the movement of goods across state
lines. Those laws are subject to the
Commerce Clause. The primary concern of the Commerce Clause is
business that involves more than one
state. The core concern of the
Privilege and Immunities Clause is
the treatment received within a state
by the citizens of other states. Thus,
the Privilege and Immunities Clause
has been applied only to laws that
discriminate based on residency.
Therefore, the Privilege and
Immunities Clause does not apply to
laws, such as California's milk pricing regulations, that create classifications based on the location of production. States have broad powers to
regulate products produced in-state,
as long as the regulations do not
unduly burden interstate commerce.
In particular, states may regulate
milk production. Clearly, these laws
may be subject to Commerce Clause
challenges but are not subject to
scrutiny under the Privilege and
Immunities Clause.

Respondent asserts that petitioners
improperly attempt to extend the
scope of the Privilege and
Immunities Clause through the
application of the "practical effects"
test. Respondent argues that petitioner's extension of the "practical
effects" test is not correct for two
reasons. First, there are no Supreme
Court cases holding that "the practical effects" test is used in determining the application of the Privilege
and Immunities Clause. Rather, the
cases focus on discrimination based
solely on residency. Second, the
"practical effects" test is a doctrine
developed through Commerce
Clause cases, not the Privilege and
Immunities Clause. Although the
Privilege and Immunities Clause and
the Commerce clause have a common origin and a shared vision of
federalism, their focuses are quite
different.

undue burden on interstate commerce. It clearly has no connection
or application to the Privilege and
Immunities Clause.

The two clauses have different aims
and set different standards for state
conduct. The Commerce Clause
acts as an implied restraint upon
state regulatory powers. State regulatory powers must give way to the
superior authority of Congress to
legislate on (or leave unregulated)
matters involving interstate commerce. The Privilege and
Immunities Clause, on the other
hand, imposes a direct restraint on
state action in the interests of interstate harmony. It is discrimination
against out-of-state residents on
matters of fundamental concern
that triggers the Privilege and
Immunities Clause, not regulation
affecting interstate commerce. The
Privilege and Immunities Clause
focuses on comity, not commerce.
The Commerce Clause guards
against economic protectionism by
prohibiting state laws that are
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-ofstate competitors. The "practical
effects" test is used to make the
often difficult determination of an

The Commerce Clause and the
Privilege and Immunities Clause are
both raised in this case. The
Commerce Clause has been relatively "dormant" in recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence. This case presents an opportunity for the Court
to indicate whether it will awaken
the sleeping giant. Finally, the
Supreme Court will revisit the application of the Privilege and
Immunities Clause. Traditionally,
violations of the Privilege and
Immunities Clause arise from discrimination based on one's residency. Now the Supreme Court is asked
to extend the doctrine to include
discrimination based on the "practical effect" of a state's law.
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SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents a basic question
of statutory interpretation. Did
Congress intend to insulate
California's milk pricing regulations
from Commerce Clause and
Privilege and Immunities Clause
scrutiny? Congressional intent
therefore will need to be determined. Interestingly, the justices are
not agreed on the utility of consulting a statute's legislative history
when interpreting statutory language. This case directly challenges
the practice of using legislative history for statutory interpretation.
The Supreme Court may provide
some insight on this oft-used
practice.

Issue No. 7
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